Brandon C.
PAF 602 (Fall 2008)

Abstract

Ostrom, V. (1989). The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration. University Alabama Press.

Vincent Ostrom’s The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration is an argument against bureaucratic administration in favor of democratic administration. Ostrom sees a fundamental dichotomy in the field of public administration and presses for a paradigm shift in classical Kuhn fashion. This shift is away from the traditional theory of public administration as layed out by Woodrow Wilson, Max Weber, and others. Drawing upon Alexis Tocqueville, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and others, Ostrom argues that fragmentation of authority and overlapping jurisdiction allow for less abuse of power and greater efficiency in administration.

Ostrom contends that the bureaucratic administration’s focus on a hierarchical authority and central command are counter to what the founders had envisioned. Promising accountability, efficiency, and expertise, bureaucratic administration inevitably concentrates power in the office of the executive; ultimately the president. Ostrom reinforces the notion that such a concentration of power will inevitably lead to abuses: “A system of constitutional rule depends on establishing limits to authority” (p. 126).

As an alternative to bureaucratic administration, Ostom champions the theory of democratic administration. Through democratic administration, practitioners of public administration make the members of the public their central focus, “Their service is to individual persons as users and consumers of public goods and services, not to political masters” (p. 114). Through this, Ostrom sees the public servant as:

Not neutral and obedient servants to the master’s command. They will refuse to obey unlawful efforts to exploit the commonwealth or to use coercive capabilities to impair the rights of persons, but they will use reason and peaceful persuasion in taking such stands. (p. 114)

Ostrom’s work provides a new perspective on the study and practice of public administration. He has forced us to take a good look at how we train practitioners and scholars in the field and makes us realize the seemingly two-faced nature of our field, that, according to Ostrom, needs serious reforms.

Critique

I must say that I found Ostrom to be a breath of fresh air after the machine that is Simon. Though, to be honest, I felt a bit lost in Ostrom’s discussions of economics as it applies to democratic administration but I think I understand the central theme of fragmented authority and overlapping jurisdiction.

With a research focus in governmental abuses of power, I especially appreciated Ostrom’s argument of the aggregation of power in the Executive and how that would lead to abuses. The example of Watergate was spot-on and fit well into his argument. Though, unfortunately for us, we need look no further than our present administration to witness the appalling effects that an aggregation of un-checked power in the Executive can do. “An unqualified concern for strengthening Executive authority will lead to absolutism and despotism” (p. 126). Our present situation simply reinforces Ostrom’s argument and serves as motivation, for those who will listen, to begin thinking of our governmental processes in a different way.

One interesting point that Ostom mentions is that the democratic form of administration was seen by Weber as a “marginal-type case” and not viable because “it can apply only to local organizations or organizations with a limited number of members” (p. 69). I would make the argument that Weber’s reasoning is invalid in our age of technology and communication. The judicious use of Internet technologies can enable vast numbers of citizens to actively participate in a democratic administration as outlined by Weber and Ostrom. By nullifying the historical unfeasibility of Weber’s time, we can rightfully bring his marginalized alternative to bureaucratic administration into the mainstream.

Overall, I greatly enjoyed reading Ostrom. For years, I have always sought the theoretical foundations to explain why aggregated and centralized power in a democratic government was a bad thing. It was one of those things that I felt strongly about and could reasonably explain in normative terms, but thanks to Ostrom, I am now able to explain it within the context of public administration and American history. I’m quite certain that there are a number of other scholars with equally good theories but placed within an argument of a public administration paradigm shift, Ostrom seems tough to beat.

Tags: abstract, abuse, critique, efficiency, power, public administration